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Abstract
Wage inequality has been signiﬁcantly higher in the United States than in conti-
nental European countries (CEU) since the 1970s. Moreover, this inequality gap has
further widened during this period as the US has experienced a large increase in wage
inequality, whereas the CEU has seen only modest changes. This paper studies the role
of labor income tax policies for understanding these facts. We begin by documenting
two new empirical facts that link these inequality diﬀerences to tax policies. First, we
show that countries with more progressive labor income tax schedules have signiﬁcantly
lower before-tax wage inequality at diﬀerent points in time. Second, progressivity is
also negatively correlated with the rise in wage inequality during this period. We then
construct a life cycle model in which individuals decide each period whether to go to
school, work, or be unemployed. Individuals can accumulate skills either in school
or while working. Wage inequality arises from diﬀerences across individuals in their
ability to learn new skills as well as from idiosyncratic shocks. Progressive taxation
compresses the (after-tax) wage structure, thereby distorting the incentives to accu-
mulate human capital, in turn reducing the cross-sectional dispersion of (before-tax)
wages. We ﬁnd that these policies can account for half of the diﬀerence between the
US and the CEU in overall wage inequality and 76% of the diﬀerence in inequality
at the upper end (log 90-50 diﬀerential). When this economy experiences skill-biased
technological change, progressivity also dampens the rise in wage dispersion over time.
The model explains 41% of the diﬀerence in the total rise in inequality and 58% of the
diﬀerence at the upper end.
Keywords: Wage Inequality, Human Capital, Skill-Biased Technical Change, Tax
Policies.
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11 Introduction
Why is wage inequality signiﬁcantly higher in the United States (and the United Kingdom)
than in continental European countries (CEU)? And why has this inequality gap between the
US and the CEU widened substantially since the 1970s (see Table 1)? More broadly, what
are the determinants of wage dispersion in modern economies? How do these determinants
interact with technological progress and government policies? The goal of this paper is to
shed light on these questions by studying the impact of labor market (tax) policies on the
determination of wage inequality, using cross-country data.
We begin by documenting two new empirical relationships between wage inequality and
tax policy. First, we show that countries with more progressive labor income tax schedules
have signiﬁcantly lower wage inequality at diﬀerent points in time. The measure of wages
we use is “gross before-tax wages”1 and can therefore be thought of as a proxy for the
marginal product of workers. From this perspective, progressivity is associated with a more
compressed productivity distribution across workers. Second, we show that countries with
more progressive income taxes have also experienced a smaller rise in wage inequality over
time, and this relationship is especially strong above the median of the wage distribution.
This latter ﬁnding is intriguing because the substantial part of the rise in wage inequality
since 1980 has taken place precisely here—above the median of the distribution (see Table 2).
Overall, these ﬁndings reveal a close relationship between progressivity and wage inequality,
which motivates the focus of this paper. However, on their own, these correlations fall short
of providing a quantitative assessment of the importance of the tax structure—e.g., what
fraction of cross-country diﬀerences in wage inequality can be attributed to tax policies?
For this purpose, we build a model.
Speciﬁcally, we construct a life cycle model that features some key determinants of
wages—most notably, human capital accumulation and idiosyncratic shocks. Here is an
overview of the framework. Individuals enter the economy with an initial stock of human
capital and are able to accumulate more human capital over the life cycle using a Ben-Porath
(1967) style technology (which essentially combines learning ability, time, and existing hu-
man capital for production). Individuals can choose to either invest in human capital on
the job up to a certain fraction of their time or enroll in school where they can invest full
1More precisely, wages are measured before taxes and the employee’s social security contributions and
also include bonuses and overtime pay when applicable. Therefore, they represent a fairly good measure of
the total monetary compensation of a worker.
2Table 1: Log Wage Diﬀerential Between the 90th and 10th Percentiles
1978-1982 2001-2005 Change
average average
Denmark 0.76 0.97 0.20
Finland 0.91 0.89 -0.01
France 1.18 1.08 -0.10
Germany 1.06 1.15 0.09
Netherlands 0.94 1.06 0.12
Sweden 0.71 0.83 0.12
CEU 0.93 1.00 0.07
UK 1.09 1.27 0.18
US 1.34 1.57 0.23
time. We assume that skills are general and labor markets are competitive. As a result, the
cost of on-the-job investment will be borne by the workers, and ﬁrms will adjust the wage
rate downward by the fraction of time invested on the job. Therefore, the cost of human
capital investment is the forgone earnings while individuals are learning new skills.
We introduce two main features into this framework. First, we assume that individuals
diﬀer in their learning ability. As a result, individuals diﬀer systematically in the amount
of investment they undertake and, consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the
life cycle. Thus, a key source of wage inequality in this model is the systematic fanning out
of the wage proﬁles.2 Second, we allow for endogenous labor supply choice, which ampliﬁes
the eﬀect of progressivity, a point that we return to shortly. Finally, for a comprehensive
quantitative assessment, we also allow idiosyncratic shocks to workers’ labor eﬃciency, and
also model diﬀerences in the unemployment insurance and pension systems, which vary
greatly across these countries.
The model described here provides a central role for policies that compress the wage
structure—such as progressive income taxes—because such policies hamper the incentives
for human capital investment. This is because a progressive system reduces after-tax wages
at the higher end of the wage distribution compared to the lower end. As a result, it reduces
the marginal beneﬁt of investment (the higher wages in the future) relative to the marginal
cost (the current forgone earnings), thereby depressing investment. A key observation is
that this distortion varies systematically with the ability level—and, speciﬁcally, it worsens
2Recent evidence from panel data on individual wages provides support for individual-speciﬁc growth
rates in wage earnings (cf. Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007, 2009), Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007)).
3Table 2: Decomposing the Change in Log 90-10 Wage Diﬀerential
Total Change Percentage due to
in Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
CEU 0.07 91% 9%
US 0.23 70% 30%
with higher ability—which then compresses the before-tax wage distribution. These eﬀects
of progressivity are compounded by endogenous labor supply and diﬀerences in average
income tax rates: the higher taxes in the CEU reduce labor supply—and, consequently, the
beneﬁt of human capital investment—further compressing the wage distribution.
The main quantitative exercise we conduct is the following. We consider the eight
countries listed in Table 1, for which we have complete data for all variables of interest. We
assume that all countries have the same innate ability distribution but allow each country to
diﬀer in the observable dimensions of their labor market structure, such as in labor income
(and consumption) tax schedules, and in unemployment insurance and retirement beneﬁts
systems. We then calibrate the model-speciﬁc parameters to the US data and keep these
parameters ﬁxed across countries. The policy diﬀerences we consider explain about half of
the observed gap in the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential between the US and the CEU in the
2000s, and 76% of the wage inequality above the median (log 90-50 diﬀerential). When
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is increased to 0.5 from its baseline value of 0.3, the
model is able to explain 60% of the log 90-10 diﬀerential and virtually all (97% to be exact)
of the log 90-50 diﬀerential observed in the data. The model explains only about 30% of
the diﬀerence in the lower tail inequality between the US and the CEU, which is not very
surprising, since the human capital mechanism is likely to be more important for higher
ability individuals and, therefore, above the median of the distribution. In contrast to the
CEU, however, the United Kingdom turns out to be an outlier in the sense that the model
is least successful in explaining the features of its wage distribution.
We also provide a decomposition that isolates the roles of (i) the progressivity of in-
come taxes, (ii) average income tax rates, (iii) consumption taxes, and (iv) pension and
unemployment insurance systems. We ﬁnd that progressivity is by far the most impor-
tant component, accounting for about 68% of the model’s explanatory power. As for the
remaining three components, each has a similar contribution to the diﬀerences in the log 90-
10 diﬀerential (10% each), but consumption taxes are most important for the upper end
4(20%) and beneﬁts institutions are most important for the lower end (18%) wage inequality.
A contribution of the present paper that could be of independent interest is the derivation
of country-speciﬁc eﬀective labor income tax schedules, which is, to our knowledge, new to
this paper. These schedules are obtained by putting together tax data from diﬀerent OECD
sources and using a ﬂexible functional form that provides a good ﬁt for this relatively diverse
set of countries. These tax schedules allow us to measure the progressivity of the (eﬀective)
tax structure at diﬀerent points in the income distribution. This is an essential ingredient
in our analysis and could also be useful for studying other questions in the future.
The second question we ask is whether the widening of the inequality gap between the
US and the CEU since the late 1970s could also be explained by the same human capital
channels discussed earlier. One challenge we face in trying to answer this question is that the
tax schedules just described are only available for the years after 2001 (because the detailed
information from OECD sources for taxes is only available after that date), whereas the
tax structure has changed over time for several of the countries in our sample. Despite this
caveat, we cautiously explore how much of the change in the US-CEU inequality gap can
be explained with ﬁxed tax schedules.
As shown in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009), the model described above with the Ben-
Porath technology does not have a well-deﬁned notion of returns to skill, which essentially
means that changes in the price of human capital (e.g., resulting from skill-biased technical
change, SBTC) have no eﬀect on investment behavior. To circumvent this problem, in
Section 6, we extend the human capital production technology to a two-factor structure
along the lines proposed in that paper.3 Assuming that all countries have experienced the
same degree of SBTC from 1980 to 2003 and using ﬁxed tax schedules over time, the model
explains about 41% of the observed gap in the rise in total wage inequality (log 90-10)
between the US and the CEU, and about 58% of the diﬀerence in the log 90-50 diﬀerentials,
during this time period. Finally, for two countries in our sample—the US and Germany—we
are also able to derive tax schedules for 1983, which reveal signiﬁcantly more ﬂattening of
tax schedules in the US compared to Germany from 1983 to 2003. When these changes in
progressivity and SBTC are jointly taken into account, the (recalibrated) model generates
3Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) have quantitatively studied a simpliﬁed version of this model—one that
abstracts from idiosyncratic shocks and endogenous labor supply as well as from all the institutional details
studied here—and applied it to the U.S. data. They concluded that even that stark version provides a
fairly successful account of several trends observed in the U.S. data since the 1970s. Here, we build on
this research by explicitly modeling labor market institutions and allowing for idiosyncratic shocks and
endogenous labor supply to understand the role of tax policy for wage inequality.
5a much larger rise in inequality in the US than in Germany and, in fact, overestimates the
actual widening of the inequality gap between these countries by 16%.
Overall, these results illustrate how government policies can strongly inﬂuence the re-
sponse of an economy to technological change by distorting individuals’ incentives to under-
take human capital investment, which keeps inequality low but at the cost of lower aggregate
output. To highlight this point, we brieﬂy discuss the implications of the model for some
macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, hours, unemployment rates, and so on.
Related Literature. Some previous papers have also examined the US-CEU diﬀerences
in wage inequality, although using techniques that are quite diﬀerent from the present paper;
see, e.g., Blau and Kahn (1996), Kahn (2000), and Gottschalk and Joyce (1998). These pa-
pers mainly use regression analyses and conclude that unionization, centralized bargaining,
and minimum wage laws are important for understanding European wage inequality data.
An important point to note, however, is that these studies do not consider the role of pro-
gressive taxation in their regression analyses. Because countries with more rigid institutions
also have more progressive tax systems (see Appendix A), this omission could attribute the
eﬀect of progressivity to these other institutions. A notable exception in this literature is
Acemoglu (2003), who constructs a fully speciﬁed model in which wage compressing insti-
tutions in the CEU aﬀect the incentives of ﬁrms such that they adopt technologies that are
less skill biased than in the US. Thus, in his model inequality rises less in Europe because
the rise in skill demand is slower in that region. His paper highlights a novel channel, which
can be complementary to the mechanism studied in this paper.
In terms of methodology, this paper is also related to the recent macroeconomics litera-
ture that has written fully speciﬁed models to address US-CEU diﬀerences in labor market
outcomes. Prominent examples include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2008), and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007), who focus on unemployment
rates, and Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2006), and Rogerson (2008), who
study labor hours diﬀerences. Several of these papers rely on representative agent models
and are, therefore, silent on wage inequality; and those that do allow for individual-level
heterogeneity do not address diﬀerences in wage inequality.4 In terms of modeling choices,
4A notable exception is Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007), who do study the implications of their
framework for wage inequality but conclude that it does not generate much wage dispersion or diﬀerences
in wage inequality across countries, despite having successful implications for unemployment rates and the
labor share.
6the closest framework to ours is Kitao, Ljungqvist, and Sargent (2008), who study a rich life
cycle framework with human capital accumulation and job search, and model the beneﬁts
system. Their goal is to explain the diﬀerent unemployment patterns over the life cycle in
the US and Europe.
Finally, a number of recent papers share some common modeling elements with ours
but address diﬀerent questions. Important examples include Krebs (2003), Caucutt, Imro-
horoglu, and Kumar (2006), Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007), and Erosa and Koreshkova
(2007). Krebs (2003) studies the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on human capital invest-
ment and shows that reducing income risk can increase growth, in contrast to the standard
incomplete markets literature, which typically reaches the opposite conclusion. Caucutt,
Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2006) develop an endogenous growth model with heterogeneity
in income. They show that a reduction in the progressivity of tax rates can have positive
growth eﬀects even in situations where changes in ﬂat rate taxes have no eﬀect. Another
important contribution is Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007), who study the distributional
implications of the Ben-Porath model and estimate the sources of lifetime inequality using
US earnings data. Finally, the interaction of human capital investment and progressive
taxes is also present in Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), who investigate the eﬀects of replac-
ing the current U.S. progressive income tax system with a proportional one in a dynastic
model. They ﬁnd a large positive eﬀect on steady state output, which comes at the expense
of higher inequality. Although our paper has many useful points of contact with this body
of work, to our knowledge, the combination of human capital accumulation, ability hetero-
geneity, progressive taxation, and endogenous labor supply is new to this paper, as is the
attempt to explain cross-country inequality facts in such a framework.
The next section starts with a stylized model to explain the various channels through
which tax policy aﬀects wage inequality. It then explains how the country-speciﬁc tax
schedules are estimated and uses the estimates to document some empirical links between
taxes and inequality. Sections 3 and 4 describe the main model and the parametrization.
Section 5 presents the cross-sectional quantitative results and sensitivity analyses. Section
6 extends this model to examine the evolution of inequality over time. Section 7 concludes.
72 US versus CEU: Diﬀerences in Empirical Trends
In this section, we document two new empirical relations between wage inequality and the
progressivity of the tax policy. To this end, we begin with a stylized version of the more
general model studied in Section 3 that illustrates the key mechanisms at work and will
allow us to deﬁne diﬀerent measures of progressivity subsequently used in documenting the
empirical facts. We then discuss how the tax schedules are derived for each country and
present the empirical ﬁndings in Section 2.3.
2.1 Model 0: Intuition in a Stylized Framework
Consider an individual who derives utility from consumption and leisure and has access to
borrowing and saving at a constant interest rate, r. Let  be the subjective time discount
factor and assume (1 + r) = 1. Each period individuals have one unit of time endowment
that they allocate between leisure and work (n 2 [0;1]). While working, individuals can
accumulate new human capital, Q, according to a Ben-Porath style technology. Speciﬁcally,
Q = Aj (hin)
, where h denotes the individual’s current human capital stock, i denotes the
fraction of working time (n) spent learning new skills, and Aj is the learning ability of
individual type j. We assume that skills are general and labor markets are competitive. As
a result, the cost of human capital investment is completely borne by workers, and ﬁrms
adjust the hourly wage rate downward by the fraction of time invested on the job (equation
(2)). Finally, labor earnings are taxed at a rate given by the average tax function  n(y),
and the marginal tax rate function is denoted by (y). The problem of a type j individual







s.t. cs + as+1 = (1    n(ys))ys + (1 + r)as
hs+1 = hs + A
j (hsisns)
 (1)
ys = PHhs(1   is)ns (2)
Using the fact that Qj
s = Aj (hsisns)
, the opportunity “cost of investment” (i.e., hsisns)
can be written as Cj(Qj
s) = (Qj
s=Aj)
(1=), which will play a key role in the optimality
conditions that follow. Now, it is useful to distinguish between two cases.
8Inelastic Labor Supply. First, suppose that labor supply is inelastic. The optimality





s) =f(1   (ys+1)) + 
2 (1   (ys+2)) + ::: + 
S s (1   (yS))g: (3)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of investment and the right-hand side is the
marginal beneﬁt, which is given by the present discounted value of net wages in all future
dates earned by the extra unit of human capital. Notice that both the marginal cost and
beneﬁt of investment take into account the marginal tax rate faced by the individual. To
understand the eﬀect of taxes, ﬁrst consider the case where taxes are ﬂat rate, i.e., 0(y)  0.





s) =f + 
2 + ::: + 
S sg:
Thus, ﬂat-rate taxes have no eﬀect on human capital investment. This is a well-
understood insight that goes back to at least Heckman (1976) and Boskin (1977).5
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As long as the individual’s earnings grow over the life cycle and the tax structure is
progressive, all tax ratios on the right-hand side will be smaller than one, which will depress
the marginal beneﬁt of investment and in turn dampen human capital accumulation. Thus,
each of these tax ratios captures the progressivity discount that eﬀectively reduces the value
of higher wage earnings in the future when compared to the lower forgone wage earnings
today. To draw an analogy to the taxation literature (c.f. Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Raﬀo,
and Rogerson (2006), etc.), it is useful to focus on a closely related measure—what we refer
to as the progressivity wedge—which is essentially one minus the progressivity discount:







5With pecuniary costs of investment, ﬂat taxes can aﬀect human capital investment, as shown by King
and Rebelo (1990) and Rebelo (1991). Similarly, Lucas (1990) shows that ﬂat taxes can have a negative
impact on human capital investment when labor supply is elastic.
9These wedges provide a key measure of the distortion created by progressive taxes. A
progressivity wedge of zero corresponds to ﬂat taxes, and the distortion grows with the
wedge. To understand the eﬀect of progressive taxes on wage inequality, ﬁrst note that
the distortion created by progressivity diﬀers systematically across ability levels. At the
low end, individuals with very low ability whose optimal plan involves no human capital
investment in the absence of taxes would experience no wage growth over the life cycle and,
therefore, no distortion from progressive taxation. At the top end, individuals with high
ability whose optimal plan implies low wage earnings early in life and very high earnings
later face very large wedges, which depress their investment. Thus, progressivity reduces
the cross-sectional dispersion of human capital and, consequently, the wage inequality in an
economy, even with inelastic labor supply.6
Endogenous Labor Supply. Second, consider now the the case with elastic labor supply.















where now the marginal beneﬁt accounts for the utilization rate of human capital, which
depends on the labor supply choice (for derivation, see Appendix B.1). Now, once again,
consider the eﬀect of ﬂat rate taxes. The intratemporal optimality condition implies that
labor supply depends negatively on the tax rate and positively on the level of human
capital. A higher tax rate depresses labor supply choice (as long as the income eﬀect is
not too large), which then reduces the marginal beneﬁt of human capital investment, which
reduces the optimal level of human capital. But labor supply in turn depends on the level
of human capital, which further depresses labor supply, the level of human capital and so
on. Therefore, with endogenous labor supply, even a ﬂat-rate tax has an eﬀect on human
capital investment, which can also be large because of the ampliﬁcation described here.7
Because average labor hours diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries and over time (c.f.,
6It is easy to see that in a model with retirement (as in the next section), a redistributive pension system
will have an eﬀect that would work very similarly to progressive income taxation. The same is true for the
unemployment insurance system, which dampens the incentives to invest, although this is likely to be more
important at the lower end of the income distribution. We incorporate both into the full model later.
7Similarly, policies that restrict labor supply (such as the 35-hour workweek law implemented in France
during much of the 2000s) will also depress human capital accumulation and compress the wage distribution.
This illustrates a situation where unions (who lobbied for the restrictions imposed in France) can aﬀect
even inequality at the upper end.
10Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2006)), it is also useful to consider a second
measure of wedge that takes into account each country’s utilization rate of its human capital
(relative to the average country in the sample) in addition to its tax structure. Formally,
for country i, what we now call the progressivity wedge*, is deﬁned as
PW









where ni is the hours per person in country i and, similarly, nALL is the average of hours
across all countries in the sample.8
In summary, the stylized model studied here implies that countries with more progressive
tax systems will have a lower wage inequality. As will become clear later, these countries
will also experience smaller rises in wage inequality in response to SBTC.
2.2 Deriving Country-Speciﬁc Tax Schedules
For each country, we follow the same procedure described here. First, the OECD tax
database provides a calculator that estimates the total labor income tax for all income levels
between half of average wage earnings (hereafter, AW) to two times AW. The calculation
takes into account several types of taxes (central government, local and state, social security
contributions made by the employee, and so on), as well as many types of deductions and
cash beneﬁts (dependent exemptions, deductions for taxes paid, social assistance, housing
assistance, in-work beneﬁts, etc.).9 Using this tool, we calculate the average labor income
tax rate,  (y), for 50%, 75%, 100%, 125%, 150%, 175%, and 200% of AW. However, tax
rates beyond 200% of AW are also relevant when individuals solve their dynamic program.
Fortunately, another piece of information is available from the OECD: speciﬁcally, we also
have the top marginal tax rate and the top bracket corresponding to it for each country. As
described in more detail in Appendix C.1, we use this information to generate average tax
rates at income levels beyond two times AW. Then, we ﬁt the following smooth function to
8Notice that because of the rescaling by nALL, if a country has suﬃciently high labor hours and low
progressivity, this wedge measure can become negative (e.g., the US). Therefore, this new measure is deﬁned
relative to a given sample of countries, but is still informative about the relative return to human capital
within a group of countries, which is the focus of this paper.
9Non-wage income taxes (e.g., dividend income, property income, capital gains, interest earnings) and
non-cash beneﬁts (free school meals or free health care) are not included in this calculation.
11Figure 1: Estimated Average Tax Rate Functions, Selected OECD Countries, 2003
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the available data points:10
 (y=AW) = a0 + a1(y=AW) + a2(y=AW)
: (8)
The parameters of the estimated average tax functions for all countries are reported in
Appendix A (Table A.2), along with the R2 values. Although the assumed functional form
allows for various possibilities, all ﬁtted tax schedules turn out to be increasing and concave.
The lowest R2 is 0.984 and the mean is 0.991, indicating a fairly good ﬁt. In Figure 1 we plot
10We have also experimented with several other functional forms, including a popular speciﬁcation pro-
posed by Guoveia and Strauss (1994), commonly used in the quantitative public ﬁnance literature (cf.
Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003), Conesa and Krueger (2006), and the references therein).
However, we found that the functional form used here to provides the best ﬁt across the board for these
relatively diverse set of countries, as seen from the high R2 values in Table A.2.
12Figure 2: Progressivity Wedges At Diﬀerent Income Levels: 1  
1 (k0:5)
1 (0:5) for k = 2;3;::;6:


















the estimated functions for three countries: one of the two least progressive (United States),
the most progressive (Finland), and one with intermediate progressivity (Germany).
Figure 2 plots the progressivity wedges for the eight countries in our sample. Speciﬁcally,
each line plots PW(0:5;0:5k) for k = 1;2;:::;6, which are essentially the wedges faced by an
individual who starts life at half the average earnings in that country and looks toward an
eventual wage level that is up to six times his initial wage. As seen in the ﬁgure, countries
are ranked in terms of their progressivity, consistent with one could conjecture: the US
and the UK have the least progressive tax system, whereas Scandinavian countries have the
most progressive one, with larger continental European countries scattered between these
two extremes. The diﬀerences also appear quantitatively large (although a more precise
evaluation needs to await the full-blown model in Section 3): for example, the marginal
beneﬁt of investment for a young worker who invests today when her wage is 0:5  AW
and aims to earn 2  AW in the future is 13% lower than a ﬂat-tax system in the US and
the UK, compared to 27% lower in Denmark and Finland. These diﬀerences grow with the
ambition level of the individual, dampening human capital investment, especially at the top
of the distribution.
13Figure 3: Progressivity Wedge and the Log 90-10 Wage Dispersion in 2003. A
wedge of zero corresponds to ﬂat taxation (no distortion), and progressivity increases along the
horizontal axis. The wedge measure used corresponds to PW(0.5,2.5) as deﬁned in the text.
















































2.3 Taxes and Inequality: Cross-Country Empirical Facts
As explained earlier, the average labor income tax schedule in 2003 has been estimated for
each of the eight countries listed in Table 1. Using these schedules, we normalize AW in
each country to 1 and focus on the progressivity wedge between half the average earnings
and 2.5 times the average earnings: PW(0:5;2:5). Similarly, when we calculate PW  for a
given country, we use the average hours per person in that country between 2001 and 2005
for ni in equation (7), and the average of the same variable across all countries for nALL:
The wage inequality data come from the OECD’s Labour Force Survey database and
are derived from the gross (i.e., before-tax) wages of full-time, full-year (or equivalent)
workers.11 This is the appropriate measure for the purposes of this paper, as it more closely
corresponds to the marginal product of each worker (and, hence, her wage) in the model.
11The deﬁnition of gross wages is given in footnote 1. An exception to this deﬁnition is France, for which
wage earnings are net of employee social security contributions. Also, in contrast to the other countries in
the sample, France excludes “agricultural and general government workers and household service workers”
from its samples when reporting wage data. Despite these caveats, we are including France in our sample
because it is not clear how much these diﬀerences aﬀect the ﬁnal wage inequality numbers. To get an
idea, we have compared the wage inequality ﬁgures from our main data to another source for France, also
provided in the OECD Labour Force Survey (reported as the GAE0 variable), which includes all workers
and reports gross wages but is only available from 2002 to 2005. At least during this period, the two data
sources agree extremely well, which is reassuring.




m ! 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.5 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88
1.0 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86
1.5 0.86 0.84 0.79
2.0 0.76 0.65
2003
0.5 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.85
1.0 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.89
1.5 0.87 0.88 0.88
2.0 0.87 0.82
The fact that the inequality data pertain to before-tax wages is important to keep in mind;
if the data were after-tax wages, the correlation between the progressivity of taxes and
inequality would be mechanical and, thus, not surprising at all.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential and progressiv-
ity wedge in the 2000s. Countries with a smaller wedge—meaning a less progressive tax
system and, therefore, smaller distortion in human capital investment—have a higher wage
inequality. The relationship is also quite strong with a correlation of 0.83. Repeating the
same calculation using the progressivity wedge yields a correlation of 0.75. Both relation-
ships are consistent with the human capital model with progressive taxes presented earlier.
Moreover, this strong relationship is robust to using wedges calculated from diﬀerent parts
of the wage distribution. This is seen in Table 3, which reports the correlation between the
log 90-10 wage diﬀerential and PW(k;m) as k and m are varied over a wide range.12
We next turn to the change in inequality over time. Figure 4 plots the progressivity
wedge* versus the change in the log 90-50 (left panel) and the log 50-10 (right panel) wage
diﬀerentials. Countries with a more progressive tax system in the 2000s have experienced a
smaller rise in wage inequality since the 1980s. The relationship is especially strong at the
top of the wage distribution and weaker at the bottom: the correlation between progressivity
and the change in the 90-50 diﬀerential is very strong ( 0:86), whereas the correlation with
12The same table also reports the correlation for each country in 1980, even though the wedges are still
the ones obtained using the 2003 tax schedules. Surprisingly, even in this case, the correlation is as strong
as before. One possible explanation is that the relative ranking of inequality across these countries might
not have changed much since 1980. Indeed, the correlation between the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential in 2003
and 1980 is 0.87.
15Figure 4: Progressivity Wedge* and Change in Log 90-50 (Left) and 50-10
(Right) Diﬀerentials: 1980 to 2003. The wedge measure for country i is PW
i (0:5;2:5) as
deﬁned in equation (7). Progressivity increases along the horizontal axis.
















































































































































  Regression Line
the 50-10 diﬀerential is much weaker (only  0:36); see Figure 4). This result is consistent
with the idea that the distortion created by progressivity is likely to be felt especially
strongly at the upper end where human capital accumulation is an important source of
wage inequality, but less so at the lower end, where other factors, such as unionization,
minimum wage laws, and so on, could be more important.
Finally, Table 4 gives a more complete picture of the diﬀerences between the two deﬁni-
tions of wedges. The top panel reports the correlation of each wedge measure with log wage
diﬀerentials, which reveals that the adjustment for utilization rates through labor hours
makes little diﬀerence in the correlations in 2003 but has a somewhat larger eﬀect (reduc-
tion) in the correlations in 1980. However, with either measure, progressivity is negatively
correlated with inequality even when one focuses on diﬀerent parts of the distribution. This
picture changes when we turn to the change in inequality over time (bottom panel). Now the
simple wedge measure has a rather low correlation with log wage diﬀerentials (the strongest
is with log 90-50 and that is  0:39). However, adjusting for hours per person increases
these correlations signiﬁcantly to  0:63 for the log 90-10 diﬀerential, and to  0:86 for the
log 90-50 diﬀerential (which is plotted in the left panel of Figure 4). We conclude that
the relationship between the wedge measures and cross-sectional inequality is quite robust,
whereas the change in inequality over time is more sensitive to the adjustment by hours per
16Table 4: Correlation Between Progressivity Measures and Wage Dispersion
Measure of Wedge:
PW(0:5;2:5) PW (0:5;2:5)












person. Since our full model includes a labor supply choice, this latter measure will become
the more relevant one, as we shall see in the next section.
3 Model 1: For Cross-Sectional Analysis
The model we use for the cross-sectional analysis is a richer version of the basic framework
presented in Section 2.1. Each individual has one unit of time in each period, which she can
allocate to three diﬀerent uses: work, leisure, and human capital investment. Preferences
over consumption, c; and leisure time, 1   n; are given by this common separable form:




If an individual chooses to work, as before, she can allocate a fraction (i) of her working
hours (n) to human capital investment. However, more realistically, we now assume that
i 2 [0;], where  < 1: An upper bound less than 100% on on-the-job investment can arise,
for example, because the ﬁrm incurs ﬁxed costs for employing each worker (administrative
burden, cost of oﬃce space, etc.) or as a result of minimum wage laws. Individuals can
invest full-time by attending school (i = 1) and enjoy leisure for the rest of the time. Thus,
the choice set is i 2 [0;] [ f1g; which is non-convex when  < 1. Finally, human capital
depreciates every period at rate  < 1. Except for the diﬀerences described here, the human
capital accumulation process is the same as the stylized model described in Section 2.1.
17As before, human capital is produced according to a Ben-Porath technology: Q =
Aj (hin)
. A key parameter in this speciﬁcation is Aj, which determines the productivity of
learning. The heterogeneity in Aj implies that individuals will diﬀer systematically in the
amount of human capital they accumulate and, consequently, in the growth rate of their
wages over the life cycle. This systematic fanning out of wage proﬁles is the major source
of wage inequality in this model. Also, as can be seen from the optimality conditions (for
example, (6)), the price of human capital has no eﬀect in this model other being a scaling
factor. Thus, for simplicity we set PH = 1 in the rest of the cross-sectional analysis.
An individual may choose to be unemployed at age s, ns = 0, in which case she receives
unemployment beneﬁt payments as speciﬁed later. Individuals retire at age R and receive
constant pension payments every year until they die at age T. The beneﬁts system is
described in more detail later on.
Idiosyncratic Shocks and Earnings. Individuals receive idiosyncratic shocks to the
eﬃciency of the labor they supply in the market. Speciﬁcally, when an individual devotes
ns(1   is) hours producing for his employer, his eﬀective labor supply becomes ns(1   is),
where the  shocks are generated by a stationary Markov transition matrix (0 j ) that









3.1 Government: Taxes and Transfers
Unemployment and Pension Beneﬁts. The unemployment beneﬁt system is modeled
so as to capture the salient features of each country’s actual system in a relatively parsimo-
nious manner. For computational reasons, we make some simplifying assumptions to the
actual systems implemented by each country. Speciﬁcally, if a worker becomes unemployed
at age s, the initial level of the unemployment payment she receives is an increasing func-
tion of her years of work before becoming unemployed, denoted by m, and also (typically)
decreases with the duration of the unemployment spell. Furthermore, in most countries
the replacement rate falls with the level of pre-unemployment income, which is also partly
captured here. Let (y;m;s) denote the unemployment beneﬁt function of an s-year-old
individual with m years of employment before becoming unemployed. Although, in real-
ity, unemployment payments depend on the pre-unemployment earnings, ys 1, making this
dependence explicit will add an additional state variable into an already demanding non-
convex computational problem. Thus, we simplify the problem by assuming that  instead
18depends on y*, which is the income the individual would have earned in the current state
at age s if he did not have the option of receiving unemployment insurance. For the precise
mathematical problem that yields y, see Appendix B.2.
After retirement individuals receive constant pension payments every period. Essen-
tially, the pension of a worker with ability level j depends on the average lifetime earnings
of workers with the same ability level (denoted by yj) as well as on the number of years the
worker has been employed up to the retirement age (denoted by mR) subject to a maximum
years of contribution, m. The pension function is denoted as 
(yj;mR).13
The Tax System and the Government Budget. The government imposes a ﬂat-rate
consumption tax,  c, as well as a potentially progressive labor income tax,  n(y).14 The
collected revenues are used for two main purposes: (i) to ﬁnance the beneﬁts system, and
(ii) to ﬁnance government expenditure, G, that does not yield any direct utility to consumers
(because of either to corruption or waste). The residual budget surplus or deﬁcit, Tr; is
distributed in a lump-sum fashion to all households regardless of employment status.
3.2 Individuals’ Dynamic Program
Individuals are able to trade a full set of one-period Arrow securities. A security that
promises to deliver one unit of consumption good in state 0 in the next period costs q(0j)
in state  today. Let In be an indicator that is equal to 0 if the agent is unemployed and 1
otherwise (if a worker or student). The dynamic program of a typical individual is given by
V (h;a;m;;s) = max
c;n;i;a0(0)












0) = (1    n(y))y + a + Tr; (11)
y = In  h(1   i)n + (1   In)  (y
;m;s); (12)
h
0 = (1   )h + A(hni)
; l
0 = (1   )l; (13)
m
0 = m + In  1fi < 1g; (14)
i 2 [0;] [ f1g;
13In reality, pension payments depend on the workers’ own earnings history, but modeling this explicitly
also adds an extra state variable, which this simpliﬁed structure avoids.
14Because capital is mobile internationally, it is harder to justify using country-speciﬁc tax rates on capital
income, unlike for labor and consumption, which are almost always taxed at destination (or the country
of residence of the worker). In particular, the mobility of capital implies the equalization of after-tax rates
across countries of comparable assets. For these reasons, we abstract from capital income taxes.
19where we suppress ability type for clarity. Notice from equation (13) that individuals cannot
accumulate human capital while unemployed (n = 0). Of course, an individual may return
to school after losing her job, in which case she is considered a student and not unemployed.
Finally, equation (14) makes clear that m0 increases only when agents work and not when
they are enrolled in school (i.e., i = 1).
After retirement, individuals receive a pension and there is no human capital investment.
Since there is no uncertainty during retirement, a riskless bond is suﬃcient for smoothing














s.t (1 +  c)c + qa





Deﬁnition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of equilibrium
decision rules, c(x), n(x), Q(x), i(x), and a0(0;x); value functions, V (x) and W R(x), for
working and retirement periods, respectively, where x = (h;a;m;;s;j) (notice the inclusion
of j into this vector); a pricing function for Arrow securities, q(0j), and a measure (x)
such that
1. Given the labor income tax function,  (y), consumption tax,  c, transfers, Tr; and
government policy functions,  and 
, individuals’ decision rules and value functions
solve problems in (10) to (14) and in (15).
2. Asset markets clear:
R
x(:;=~ ) a0(0;x)d(x) = 0 for all combinations of (~ ;0).15
3. (x) is generated by individuals’ optimal choices.




















15The notation x(:; = ~ ) indicates that the integral is taken over the entire domain of variables in state
vector x, except for , which is set equal to ~ . Others below are deﬁned analogously.
20The ﬁrst term in the government’s budget is the total tax revenue from labor income
collected from all agents who are working and younger than retirement age. Similarly, the
second term is the total tax revenue from the consumption tax, but it is collected from all
agents including the retirees. On the right-hand side, the pension payments only depend on
a worker’s ability through yj and the number of years she worked until retirement (mR(x)),
which in turn depends on the full state vector x at age R   1. Therefore, we integrate the
pension payments over the full state vector x conditioning on age R   1 and then sum the
same amount over all ages greater than R   1 to ﬁnd total pension payments.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we begin by discussing the parameter choices for the model. Our basic
calibration strategy is to take the United States as a benchmark and pin down a number of
parameter values by matching certain targets in the US data.16 We then assume that other
countries share the same parameter values with the US along unobservable dimensions (such
as the distribution of learning ability), but diﬀer in the dimensions of their labor market
policies that are feasible to model and calibrate (speciﬁcally, consumption and labor income
tax schedules, the retirement pension system, and the unemployment insurance system).
We then examine the diﬀerences in economic outcomes—speciﬁcally in wage dispersion,
output, and labor supply—that are generated by these policy diﬀerences alone.
4.1 Calibration
A model period corresponds to one year of calendar time. Individuals enter the economy at
age 20 and retire at 65 (S = 45). Retirement lasts for 20 years and everybody dies at age
85. The net interest rate, r, is set equal to 2%, and the subjective time discount rate is set
to  = 1=(1 + r).17 The curvature of the human capital accumulation function, ; is set
equal to 0.80, broadly consistent with the existing empirical evidence, and the maximum
investment allowed on the job, , is set to 0.50 (see Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) for further
justiﬁcation of these parameter choices).
16Taking the US as the benchmark is motivated by the fact that its economy is subject to much less of the
labor market rigidities present in the CEU—such as unionization and other distorting institutions. Because
these institutions are not modeled in this paper, the US provides a better laboratory for determining the
unobservable parameters than other countries where these distortions could be more important for wage
determination.
17This interest rate should be thought of as the “after-tax” rate, since we do not model taxes on savings
explicitly.
21Utility Function. The utility function given in (9) has two parameters to calibrate: the
curvature of leisure, '; and the utility weight attached to leisure,  . These parameters are
jointly chosen to pin down the average hours worked in the economy, as well as the average
Frisch labor supply elasticity. We assume that each individual has 100 hours of discretionary
time per week (about 14 hours a day), and taking 40 hours per week as the average labor
supply for employed workers in the US implies n = 0:4. With power utility, the theoretical
Frisch elasticity of labor is equal to 1 n
n
1
': Because of heterogeneity across individuals, labor
supply varies in the population, so there is a distribution of Frisch elasticities. We simply
target the Frisch elasticity implied by the average labor hours, n. The empirical target
we choose is 0.3, which is consistent with the estimates surveyed by Browning, Hansen,
and Heckman (1999), which range from zero to 0.5. Although it is common to use higher
elasticity values in representative agent macro studies (e.g., Prescott (2004) among many
others), values of 0.5 or lower are more common in quantitative models with heterogeneous
agents (cf. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008), Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov
(2009)). As will become clear later, a higher Frisch elasticity improves the performance of
our model, so in our baseline case we choose the relatively conservative value of 0.3.18 In
the sensitivity analysis, we will experiment with both a higher Frisch elasticity of 0.5 and a
case without hours choice (i.e., a 0-1 choice).
Distributions: Learning Ability, Initial Human Capital, and Shocks. Agents have
two individual-speciﬁc attributes at the time they enter the economy: learning ability and
initial human capital endowment. We assume that these two variables are jointly uniformly
distributed in the population and are perfectly correlated with each other.19Although the
assumption of perfect correlation is made partly for simplicity, a strong positive correlation
is plausible and can be motivated as follows. The present model is interpreted as applying
to human capital accumulation after age 20 and by that age high-ability individuals will
have invested more than those with low ability, leading to heterogeneity in human capital
stocks at that age, which would then be very highly correlated with learning ability. Indeed,
18With our baseline calibration, the Frisch elasticities in the population range from 0.25 to 0.39.
19We prefer the uniform distribution over a Gaussian distribution because it has a bounded support,
so initial human capital and ability can be easily ensured to be non-negative. Another choice would be
a lognormal distribution, but most empirical measures of ability ﬁnd it more closely approximated by a
symmetric distribution, unlike a lognormal one. It will turn out, however, that the wage distribution
generated by the model will be closer to lognormal with a longer right tail (more consistent with the data),
as a result of the convexity arising from the human capital production function.
22Table 5: Baseline Parametrization
Parameter Description Value
' Curvature of utility of leisure 5:0 (Frisch = 0.3)
  Weight on utility of leisure 0:20
 Curvature of human capital function 0:80
S Years spent in the labor market 45
T Retirement duration (years) 20
r Interest rate 0:02
 Time discount factor 1=(1 + r)
 Maximum investment time on the job 0:50







Average initial human capital (scaling) 4:95
Parameters calibrated to match data targets













Coeﬀ. of variation of initial human capital 0:076
 [Aj]=E [Aj] Coeﬀ. of variation of ability 0:408

 Dispersion of Markov shock 0:23
p Transition probability for Markov shock 0:90
Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007) estimate the parameters of the standard Ben-Porath
model from individual-level wage data, and ﬁnd learning ability and human capital at age 20
to be strongly positively correlated (corr: 0.792). Making the slightly stronger assumption
of perfect correlation allows us to collapse the two-dimensional heterogeneity in Aj and h
j
0
into one, speeding up computation signiﬁcantly.
Therefore, this jointly uniform distribution of (Aj;h
j







is a scaling parameter and is simply set to a computationally conve-
nient value, leaving three parameters: (i) the cross-sectional standard deviation of ini-






; (ii) the mean learning ability, E [Aj], and (iii) the dispersion
of ability,  (Aj): The idiosyncratic shock process, ; is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order
Markov process, with two possible values, f1   
;1 + 
g, and a symmetric transition ma-
trix:  =
"
p 1   p
1   p p
#
:
This structure yields two more parameters, 
 and p, to be calibrated—for a total of ﬁve
parameters. Finally, because there is measurement error in individual-level wage data, we
add a zero mean iid disturbance to the wages generated by the model (which has no eﬀect
on individuals’ optimal choices).
23Data Targets. Our calibration strategy is to require that the wages generated by
the model be consistent with micro-econometric evidence on the dynamics of wages found
in panel data on US households. Speciﬁcally, these empirical studies begin by writing a


























s is the “wage residual” obtained by regressing raw wages on a polynomial in age;
the terms in brackets, [aj + bjs], capture the individual-speciﬁc systematic (or life cycle)
component of wages that result from diﬀerential human capital investments undertaken
by individuals with diﬀerent ability levels, and zj
s is an AR(1) process with innovation j
s.
Finally, "j
s is an iid shock that could capture classical measurement error that is pervasive in
micro data and/or purely transitory movements in wages. For concreteness, in the discussion
that follows, we refer to the ﬁrst two terms in brackets as the “systematic component” and
to the latter two terms as the “stochastic component” of wages.
We begin with "s and assume that it corresponds to the measurement error in the wage
data. This is consistent with the ﬁnding in Guvenen and Smith (2009) that the majority
of transitory variation in wages is due to measurement error. Based on the results of the
validation studies from the US wage data,20 we take the variance of the measurement error to
be 10% of the true cross-sectional variance of wages in each country, which yields 2
" = 0:034
for the United States. We then choose the following ﬁve moments from the US data to pin
down the ﬁve parameters identiﬁed earlier:
1. the mean log wage growth over the life cycle (informative about E(Aj)),
2. the cross-sectional dispersion of wage growth rates, (bj) (informative about (Aj)),
3. the cross-sectional variance of the stochastic component (informative about 
),
4. the average of the ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬃcients of the stochastic component
of wages (informative about p), and
5. the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential in the population (which, together with the previous
moments, is informative about (h
j
0)).
20For an excellent survey of the available validation studies and other evidence on measurement error in
wage and earnings data, see Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001).
24The target value for the mean log wage growth over the life cycle (i.e., the cumulative
growth between ages 20 and 55) is 45%. This number is roughly the middle point of the
ﬁgures found in studies that estimate life cycle wage and income proﬁles from panel data
sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID); see, for example, Gourinchas and
Parker (2002), Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006), and Guvenen (2007). The second data
moment is the cross-sectional standard deviation of wage growth rates, (bj). The estimates
of this parameter are quite consistent across diﬀerent papers, regardless of whether one uses
wages or earnings (which is not always the case for some other parameters of the income
process).21 We take our empirical target to be 2%, which represents an average of these
available estimates.
The next two moments are included to ensure that the model is consistent with some
key statistical properties of the stochastic component of wages in the data. These moments
are (i) the unconditional variance of the stochastic component, (zs + "s), as well as (ii) the
average of its ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬃcients. The empirical counterparts for these
moments are taken from Haider (2001), which is the only study that estimates a process
for hourly wages and allows for heterogeneous proﬁles. The ﬁgure for the unconditional
variance can be calculated to be 0.109 and the average of autocorrelations is calculated to
be 0.33, using the estimates in Table 1 of his paper.22;23
Our ﬁfth, and ﬁnal, moment is the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential in 2003. Adding this
moment ensures that the calibrated model is consistent with the overall wage inequality in
the US in that year, which is the benchmark against which we measure all other countries.
The empirical target value is 1.57 (from the OECD’s Labour Force Survey data). Table 6
displays the empirical values of the ﬁve moments as well as their counterparts generated
by the calibrated model. As can be seen here, all moments are matched fairly well; some
21Using male hourly earnings data, Haider (2001) estimates a value of 2.07%, and using annual earnings
data he estimates it to be 2.02%. Baker (1997, Table 4, rows 6 and 8) uses an annual earnings measure and
estimates values of 1.76% and 1.97% in the two most closely related speciﬁcations to the present paper,
whereas Guvenen (2009) ﬁnds a value of 1.94%, again using male annual earnings data. Finally, Guvenen
and Smith (2009) estimate a process for household annual earnings and obtain a value of 1.87%.
22Over the sample period, Haider estimates the average innovation variance to be 0.074, an AR coeﬃcient
of 0.761, and an MA coeﬃcient of  0:42. Using these parameters, the unconditional variance is 0.109.
23We match the average of the ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬃcients because Haider (2001) estimates an
ARMA(1,1) process, whereas in our model we employ a slightly more parsimonious structure (AR(1)+ iid
shock). This latter formulation is a common choice in calibrated macroeconomic models because it requires
one fewer state variable while still capturing the dynamics of wages quite well. Nevertheless, because of this
diﬀerence, it is not possible to exactly match each autocorrelation coeﬃcient in the ARMA(1,1) speciﬁcation
and, so, we match the average of the ﬁrst three. In the calibrated model, the ﬁrst three autocorrelations
are 0.48, 0.33, and 0.20 compared to 0.42, 0.32, and 0.24 in the data.
25Table 6: Empirical Moments Used for Calibrating Model Parameters
Moment Data Model
Mean log wage growth from age 20 to 55 0.45 0.46
Cross-sectional standard deviation of wage growth rates 2.00% 2.00%
Cross-sectional variance of stochastic component 0.109 0.107
Average of ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬀ. of stochastic component 0.33 0.34
Log 90-10 ratio in 2003 1.57 1.58
are matched exactly.24 One point to note is that even though the average of the ﬁrst
three autocorrelation coeﬃcients is pretty low (0.33), recall that the stochastic component
includes measurement error as well, which is iid. The Markov shocks to human capital,
which approximate the AR(1) process in the data, have a ﬁrst order annual autocorrelation
of 0.80 (implied by p = 0:90 shown in Table 5).
Unemployment and Pension System. A great deal of variation can be found across
countries in the parameters that control the generosity, the duration, and the insurance com-
ponent of the beneﬁts system. For example, among the countries in our sample, individuals
in Denmark and the Netherlands receive the largest pension payments after retirement with
the present value of retirement wealth for the average individual exceeding half a million US
dollars (as of 2007). The US and the UK, however, have the lowest pension entitlements—
less than six times the average annual earnings in each respective country (and less than
half the wealth in Denmark and the Netherlands). We provide the exact formulas for each
country and discuss the speciﬁcs in more detail in Appendix D. Finally, the calibration of G
(the surplus wasted by the government) is challenging because of the diﬃculty of obtaining
reliable estimates of its magnitude. In the baseline case, we assume G = 0. So, the govern-
ment rebates back all the surplus to households in a lump-sum fashion (Tr). We relax this
assumption in Section 5.3 and ﬁnd that it has very little eﬀect on the results.
Consumption Taxes. The average tax rate on consumption is taken from McDaniel
(2007), who provides estimates for 15 OECD countries for the period 1950 to 2003 by
calculating the total tax revenue raised from diﬀerent types of consumption expenditures
and dividing this number by the total amount of corresponding expenditure. McDaniel
24Because the moments chosen are typically non-linear functions of the underlying parameters we cal-
ibrate, having ﬁve moments and ﬁve parameters does not guarantee that all moments will be matched
exactly. Considering this, the close correspondence is an encouraging sign that the model is ﬂexible enough
to generate wage dynamics similar to that observed in the data.
26Figure 5: Life Cycle Proﬁle of Labor Hours
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(2007) does not provide an estimate for Denmark, so we set this country’s consumption tax
equal to that of Finland, which has a comparable value-added tax rate.
4.2 Life Cycle Proﬁles of Wages, Earnings, and Hours
Before concluding this section, a useful step is to brieﬂy examine if the calibrated model
produces plausible behavior over the life cycle for wages, earnings, and labor hours compared
to the US data. Figure 5 plots the mean log hours of employed workers, which is computed
using 10,000 simulated life cycle paths for individuals drawn from the joint distribution of
(Aj;h
j
0). As seen here, the average hours is close to the chosen target of 0.40 and displays
little trend over the life cycle. In the US data, average hours rises to about age 25 and then
remains fairly ﬂat until about age 55, after which point it starts declining until retirement
(cf. Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2009), Figure 2). Although the model does not capture
the rise in hours before age 25, the ﬂat hours proﬁle during most of the working life is well
captured by the model. Hours also decline in the model, especially after age 50, although
not by as much as in the data. Some of the decline in the data is attributable to health
shocks or partial early retirement, which are not modeled here.
The dashed lines around the mean proﬁle in Figure 5 show the two standard deviation
bands of the hours distribution in the population, which reveal a small rise in hours disper-
sion over the life cycle. More precisely, the variance of log hours goes up by 1.6 log points,
which is fairly small compared to the mean hours of 0.40. Again, this is broadly consistent
27Figure 6: Life Cycle Proﬁles of Wages and Earnings: Mean (Left), Variance (Right)
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with the ﬁndings of Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2009), who document a fairly ﬂat vari-
ance proﬁle for hours with a rise only after the mid-40s. Although the rise in the dispersion
of hours found by these authors is somewhat larger than what is generated by our model
(judging from their Figures 9 and 10), this discrepancy can be ﬁxed here by increasing the
Frisch labor supply elasticity, an exercise we conduct in Section 5.3.
The left panel of Figure 6 plots the life cycle proﬁle of average log wages and earnings
approximated by a cubic polynomial in age, as commonly done in the literature. The model
reproduces the well-known hump shape in wages and earnings. In particular, the mean log
wage grows by 45% (as calibrated) and peaks around age 50 and then declines by about
20% until retirement age. Mean log earnings follows a similar pattern but declines by about
5% more than the mean wage as a result of the fall in labor supply later in life, seen in
Figure 5. Finally, the right panel plots the variances of log wages and earnings, which both
rise in a convex fashion up to 55 and then grow more slowly. The variance of earnings grows
faster than that of wages because hours dispersion rises over the life cycle. Guvenen (2009)
constructs the empirical counterpart for earnings from the PSID and ﬁnds this proﬁle to
rise from about 0.20 to 0.73 from age 22 to 62. In the model, the variance rises from about
0.15 to 0.75 from age 20 to 65, fairly consistent with this empirical evidence.
Overall, with the ﬁve empirical moments we targeted, the model appears to generate
life cycle behavior—in terms of both ﬁrst and second moments—that is broadly consistent
with the data, which is encouraging for the cross-country comparisons we undertake next.
28Figure 7: Log 90-10 Wage Dispersion in Eight OECD Countries: Model versus Data





























In this section, we begin by presenting the implications of the calibrated model for wage
inequality diﬀerences across countries at a point in time. We then provide decompositions
that quantify the separate eﬀects of progressivity, average income tax rates, consumption
taxes, and beneﬁts institutions on these results. We then perform sensitivity analyses with
respect to key parameters.
5.1 The Cross Section in the 2000s
First, Figure 7 plots the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential for each country in the data against the
value implied by the model. The correlation between the simulated and actual data is 0.86,
suggesting that the model is able to capture the relative ranking of these eight countries in
terms of overall wage inequality observed in the data. Of course, with eight data points a
seemingly high correlation can be driven by a few outliers with no obvious pattern among
the rest of the data points. As seen in the ﬁgure, however, this is not the case: the countries
line up nicely along the regression line. Similarly, the left panel of Figure 8 plots the log
90-50 wage diﬀerential for each country in the data against the predicted value by the
model. The correlation between the actual and simulated data is even higher—0.88—for
the log 90-50 wage diﬀerential. The correlation of the simulated and actual log 50-10 wage
diﬀerential, on the other hand, is somewhat lower at 0.63 (right panel of Figure 8). Thus,
29Figure 8: Wage Dispersion in Eight OECD Countries: Log 90-50 (left) and Log 50-10 (right)
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the model does a better job in matching the relative ranking of countries for the upper end
wage inequality. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that progressive taxation aﬀects
the human capital investment of high-ability individuals more than others and, therefore,
the mechanism is more relevant above the median of the wage distribution.
Although these ﬁgures and correlations reveal a clear qualitative relationship, they do
not allow us to quantify how important taxation is for cross-country diﬀerences in inequality.
For this, we turn to Table 7. The ﬁrst two columns report the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential in
the data for all countries, ﬁrst in levels (second column) and then expressed as a deviation
from the US, which is our benchmark country (third column). For example, in Denmark
the log 90-10 diﬀerential is 0.97, which is 60 log points lower than that in the US. The third
and fourth columns display the corresponding statistics implied by the calibrated model.
Again, for Denmark, the model generates a log 90-10 diﬀerential that is 38 log points below
what is implied by the model for the US. Therefore, the model explains 63% (= 38=60) of
the diﬀerence in the log 90-10 diﬀerential between the US and Denmark, reported in column
(e). Similar comparisons show that the model does quite well in explaining the level of wage
inequality in Germany (41 log points lower than the US inequality in the data versus 29 log
points lower in the model) but does poorly in explaining the UK (29 log points diﬀerence
in the data versus 7 log points in the model). The fraction explained by the model ranges
from 30% for France to 71% for Germany. Overall, the model explains 49% of the actual
gap in inequality between the US and the CEU in 2003.
30Table 7: Measures of Wage Inequality: Benchmark Model versus Data
Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
Data Model % explained % explain. % explain.
Level  from US Level  from US (d)/(b)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Denmark 0.97 0.60 1.20 0.38 63 93 37
Finland 0.89 0.67 1.26 0.33 49 77 27
France 1.08 0.49 1.44 0.14 30 74 12
Germany 1.15 0.41 1.29 0.29 71 79 59
Netherlands 1.06 0.50 1.35 0.23 46 63 30
Sweden 0.83 0.73 1.28 0.30 42 69 20
CEU 1.00 0.57 1.30 0.28 49% 76% 27%
UK 1.27 0.29 1.51 0.07 22 1 49
US 1.57 0.0 1.58 0.00 –
To understand which part of the wage distribution is better captured by the model, the
next two columns display the same calculation performed in column (e), but now separately
for the log 90-50 (f) and 50-10 (g) diﬀerentials. For all countries in the CEU, the model
explains the upper tail inequality much better than the inequality at the lower end. For
example, for Denmark, the model explains 93% of the log 90-50 diﬀerential while only
generating 37% of the log 50-10 diﬀerential. In fact, the model explains at least 63% of
the upper tail inequality for all countries in the CEU, averaging 76% across all countries,
whereas it explains on average only 27% of the log 50-10 diﬀerential. Among the CEU,
Germany is the one best explained by the model overall: a healthy 79% of the upper tail
and 59% of the lower tail inequality is generated by the model. The model does poorly in
explaining the small log 50-10 diﬀerential in France (12%). One reason could be the legal
minimum wage (not modeled here), which is equal to 62% of average earnings in France—
the highest among the CEU—and much higher than the 36% of average earnings in the
U.S. If these diﬀerences were modeled, it could be possible to better reconcile the model
with the very small lower tail wage inequality in France. Finally, a notable exception to
these generally strong ﬁndings is the UK, which is an important outlier: the model explains
almost none of the diﬀerence between the UK and US at the upper tail (1% to be exact),
whereas it explains 49% of the inequality at the lower end. As we shall see later, we found
UK to be an outlier along most dimensions this paper attempts to explain and the least
well understood economy when viewed through the lens of this model.
31Finally, we examine if the calibrated model is broadly consistent with the share of wage
inequality accounted for by the upper and lower tails in each region. When the data for all
countries in the CEU are aggregated, we ﬁnd that 57% of the log 90-10 wage dispersion in
this region is located above the median and 43% is below the median (statistics not reported
in the table to save space). This ratio is very well matched by the model (56.5%), even
though no moment from the CEU is used in the calibration. Turning to the US, the upper
tail inequality as a fraction of the total is slightly lower than the CEU, at 53%. The model
somewhat overstates the inequality at the upper tail (59%) compared to the US data.
5.2 Decomposing the Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Policies
The baseline model incorporates several diﬀerences between the labor market policies of the
US and the CEU countries. Here, we quantify the separate roles played by each of these
components for the results presented in the previous section. We conduct three decompo-
sitions. First, we assume that countries in the CEU have the same beneﬁts institutions as
the US but diﬀer in all other dimensions considered in the baseline model. This experiment
separates the role of the tax system for wage inequality from that of the beneﬁts system.
Second, we also set the consumption taxes of each country equal to that in the US but
each country retains its own income tax schedule as in the baseline model. This experiment
quantiﬁes the explanatory power of the model that is coming from the income tax system
alone. Third, we go one step further and assume that each country keeps the same progres-
sivity of its income tax schedule but is identical in all other ways to the US, including the
average income tax rate. This experiment isolates the role of progressivity alone. In each
case, we adjust the lump-sum transfers to balance the government’s budget.25
Table 8 reports the results. First, in column 2, we assume that all countries have the
same beneﬁts system as the US. In panel A, the correlation between the data and model
is only slightly lower than in the baseline case for the log 90-10 and 90-50 diﬀerentials and
is, in fact, higher for the 50-10 diﬀerential. Turning to panel B, the fraction of the US-
CEU diﬀerence explained by the model goes down in all cases. For example, for the overall
inequality, the explained fraction goes down from 0.49 to 0.44. Therefore, (income and
25Adjusting the lump-sum transfers creates an income eﬀect on individuals’ choices in addition to the
changes in policies considered in each experiment. An alternative would be to keep the lump-sum amount
ﬁxed and not balance the budget in each case. We have conducted all three experiments both ways and
found only quantitatively minor diﬀerences (available upon request), so in the paper we only report the
case where the lump-sum amount is adjusted.
32Table 8: Decomposing the Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Policies
Benchmark All taxes Lab. Inc. Tax Progressivity
Diﬀ. from Benchmark: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Progressivity — — — —
Average income taxes — — — set to US
Consumption tax — — set to US set to US
Beneﬁts institutions — set to US set to US set to US
A. Correlation Between Data and Model
90-10 0.86 0.82 0.75 0.80
90-50 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.87
50-10 0.63 0.79 0.62 0.60
B. Fraction of US-CEU Diﬀerence Explained by Model
90-10 0.49 0.44 (90%)a 0.37 (76%) 0.33 (68%)
90-50 0.76 0.72 (95%) 0.57 (75%) 0.48 (63%)
50-10 0.27 0.22 (82%) 0.20 (74%) 0.20 (74%)
aThe numbers in parentheses express the fraction explained by the model in each column as a percentage of
the benchmark case reported in column (1).
consumption) taxes together account for 90% (= 44=49) of the model’s explanatory power
for the overall inequality diﬀerence, and the beneﬁts system accounts for the remaining 10%.
When we look separately at the tails, we see that the beneﬁts system is less important for
inequality at the top (5% of the model’s explanatory power) and more important at the
bottom (18%). The bottom line is that with tax diﬀerences alone, the model generates 72%
of the wage inequality diﬀerences above the median and 44% half of the diﬀerence in overall
wage inequality observed in the data between the US and the CEU.
In the next column, we also eliminate the diﬀerences in consumption taxes across coun-
tries. The model-data correlations go further down but, again, somewhat modestly. In
panel B, the explanatory power of the model that is attributable to income taxes alone is
roughly 75% for all three measures of wage inequality. The diﬀerence between columns 2
and 3 provides a useful measure of the role of consumption taxes: these taxes account for
about 14% (= 90%   76%) of the model’s explanatory power for overall wage inequality.
Consumption taxes are more important for top-end inequality (20% of the model’s total
explanatory power) and much less important for the lower-end inequality (8%).
Next, we investigate whether the power of income taxes comes from diﬀerences in the
average rates across countries or from diﬀerences in the progressivity structure. In other
33words, if continental Europe diﬀered from the US only in the progressivity of its labor
income tax system—but had the same average tax rate on labor income—how much of the
diﬀerences in wage inequality found in the baseline model would still remain? To answer
this question, we proceed as follows. First, we need to be careful about how we adjust the
average tax rate to the US level, because many plausible modiﬁcations to the tax structure
will simultaneously aﬀect progressivity (as measured, for example, by the wedges). We
show in Appendix C.2 how the average income tax rate can be adjusted to any desired rate
without aﬀecting progressivity. Then, using these hypothetical tax schedules, we solve each
country’s problem assuming that all countries have identical labor market policies (set to
the US benchmark) and their tax schedules generate the same average tax rate as in the US
when using individuals’ choices made using the US income tax schedule. In column 4, the
correlation between the model and the data changes very little compared to the baseline case
reported in column 1, regardless of which part of the wage distribution we look at. In panel
B, we see that progressivity alone is responsible for 68% of the explanatory power of the
model for the log 90-10 diﬀerential. Comparing this to the total eﬀect of taxes (calculated
earlier as 75%), it becomes clear that progressivity is the key component of the income tax
system that is responsible for understanding wage inequality diﬀerences.
In summary, the beneﬁts system and consumption taxes together are responsible for
about a quarter of the explanatory power of the model for wage inequality. The more
important ﬁnding concerns the role of progressivity, which, for all practical purposes, is the
key component of the income tax structure for understanding wage inequality diﬀerences.
Diﬀerences in the average income tax rate are the least important among the four types of
policy diﬀerences we examine in this paper.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion
We now conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to some key parameters of the model.
We begin with the Frisch labor supply elasticity and consider two opposite cases: (i) the
case with a high Frisch elasticity of 0.5 and (ii) the case without continuous hours choice:
n 2 f0;0:40g. As a third exercise, we allow for the possibility that some of the budget
surplus is wasted (i.e., G > 0) rather than being rebated back to households in full. In
each case that follows, the model is recalibrated to match the same ﬁve targets in Table 6.
Finally, we discuss the implications of the model for wage inequality among male workers,
instead of all workers considered so far.
34Table 9: Eﬀect of Labor Supply Elasticity on Wage Inequality Diﬀerences
Frisch = 0.5 Discrete hours: n 2 f0;0:40g
Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10 Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Denmark 84 1.22 48 46 47 47
Finland 62 96 36 34 41 28
France 39 97 16 15 32 9
Germany 85 95 68 45 39 56
Netherlands 54 78 30 28 34 24
Sweden 53 92 24 25 32 20
CEU 62% 97% 33% 32% 38% 28%
UK 32 -10 86 25 0 56
5.3.1 Eﬀect of Labor Supply Elasticity
Frisch Elasticity = 0.5. We begin by setting ' = 3:0; which implies a Frisch elasticity of
0.5. We then recalibrate the ﬁve parameters discussed in Section 4.1 to match the same ﬁve
moments reported in Table 6. Table 9 reports the counterpart of the analysis we conducted
for the benchmark model and reported in Table 7. Comparing the two tables makes it clear
that a higher Frisch elasticity improves the model’s explanatory power across the board.
Now the model can explain 62% of the US-CEU diﬀerence in the log 90-10 wage diﬀerentials
(compared to 49% in the benchmark case) and a remarkable 97% of the upper tail inequality
(from 76% before). However, the improvement in the log 50-10 diﬀerential is very modest,
going up to 33% from 27% in the benchmark case.
Are there any drawbacks to using this alternative calibration? Not many, in fact. One
notable shortcoming compared to the benchmark case is that because hours and wages
are strongly correlated in this model, a higher Frisch elasticity implies that the rise in
earnings inequality is signiﬁcantly higher than the rise in wage inequality over the life
cycle. How important this shortcoming, though, is not obvious. One possible ﬁx would be
to add preference shocks to the value of leisure (similar to the route taken by Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2008) but also allow the value of leisure to change stochastically).
This approach would reduce the wage-hours correlation and could mitigate this problem
without greatly aﬀecting the main results. In this paper, we have not pursued this approach
of introducing more heterogeneity into an already rich and complex model and, instead,
opted for the more conservative lower Frisch elasticity ﬁgures for our baseline model.
35Discrete Hours Choice: Full-Time Work versus Unemployment. To better un-
derstand the role of continuous labor hours choice, we now examine another case where
workers can only choose between full-time employment at ﬁxed hours (n = 0:40) and un-
employment. The parameters of the utility function are the same as in the baseline case.
The results are reported in the last three columns of Table 9. Without the ampliﬁcation
provided by endogenous labor supply—and the resulting dispersion in hours both within
each country and across countries—the explanatory power of the model falls and, in some
cases, it falls signiﬁcantly. For example, the model explains 32% of the diﬀerence in the log
90-10 diﬀerential, compared to 49% in the benchmark case and 62% in the high Frisch case.
For the upper-end inequality, the diﬀerence is even larger: the model now explains 38%,
half of the baseline value, and also much lower than the 97% in the high Frisch case. The
diﬀerence is much smaller at the lower tail, however, where the explained fraction slightly
rises to 28% from 27% in the baseline, and is only a bit lower than 33% in the high Frisch
case. Overall, these ﬁndings underscore the importance of the interaction of endogenous
labor supply choice with progressive taxation for understanding wage inequality diﬀerences
across countries, especially above the median of the distribution.
5.3.2 Wasteful Government Expenditures versus Transfers
In the baseline model, the surplus was rebated back to households in a lump-sum fashion,
essentially assuming that government expenditures are perfect substitutes for private con-
sumption. To examine if our results are sensitive to this assumption, we now assume that
half of the government surplus is wasted: G = Tr, and each component equals half of the
budget surplus (i.e., tax revenues minus beneﬁts payments). This assumption is probably
extreme, but it is useful in illustrating whether the results are sensitive to this scenario.
From Table 10, we see that, qualitatively, the explanatory power of the model is lower for
some countries for the log 90-10 and 90-50 diﬀerentials but higher for the 50-10 diﬀerential.
Quantitatively, however, the eﬀect is minimal across the board. In fact, in some cases, no
diﬀerence is visible (because of rounding) compared to the benchmark case in Table 7.
5.3.3 Implications for Male Wage Inequality
A potential caveat to the analysis conducted so far is that we study wage inequality among
all workers (including females) whereas some of the model parameters were calibrated in
Section 4.1 using empirical targets obtained from male wage data. This approach was
36Table 10: Eﬀect of Wasteful Government Spending on Wage Inequality Results
G = Tr = 0:5 Gov’t Surplus
Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
(a) (b) (c)
Denmark 63 90 38
Finland 49 75 29
France 30 71 14
Germany 69 75 60
Netherlands 45 59 31
Sweden 42 67 23
CEU 49% 73% 29%
UK 21 0 49
necessitated by the fact that reliable empirical estimates of these moments for female workers
are diﬃcult to ﬁnd in the literature (mainly due to the diﬃculties involved with the extensive
margin of female labor supply). To see if this is an important issue, we recalculate the main
statistics reported in the previous section, but this time using data from the OECD on male
wage inequality alone. For male workers, the model explains 45% of the diﬀerence between
the US and the CEU in the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential, 79% of the log 90-50 diﬀerential,
and 23% of the log 50-10 diﬀerential. These ﬁgures are quite comparable to those obtained
in the baseline model for all workers (Table 7). Similarly, the model-data correlations using
male data are 0.91 for the log 90-10, 0.86 for the log 90-50, and 0.78 for the log 50-10 wage
diﬀerentials, which are, again, quite close to those from the baseline model (Figures 7 and
8). Overall, these results suggest that calibrating some parameters by matching moments
from male wage data despite our focus on overall wage inequality (because of its obvious
relevance for the overall state of the economy) is probably not greatly aﬀecting our results.
They also to suggest that the human capital channels explored in this paper are likely to
be important for female workers as much as for males, given that the model’s explanatory
power for males and overall wage inequality are very close to each other.
5.4 Other Implications
Besides wage dispersion, the model studied so far also makes predictions for some aggregate
variables. We now discuss these brieﬂy (Table 11). Notice that the ﬁrst two columns report
variables only as ratios. This is because for GDP per worker, the levels are not informative
(and not comparable to the data counterpart); and for hours per worker, the model was
37Table 11: Aggregate Variables in the CEU and in the US: Model vs Data, 2001–5
GDP/ Worker Hours/Worker Unemp. Rate Educational
Attainment
CEU/US CEU/US CEU US CEU US
Data 0.769 0.813 7.4% 5.5% 27.8% 38.0%
Model 0.773 0.905 7.5% 5.7% 21.5% 37.9%
calibrated to match the US data exactly (n = 0:40), so, again, there is no information in
levels.
The model does a good job of matching GDP per worker diﬀerences: in the data, the
CEU has a GDP per worker that is 23% lower than that of the US, which is nearly matched
by the model. The UK, on the other hand, is again an outlier (not shown in the table). In
the model, UK’s GDP per worker is only 1.4% lower, whereas it is 24% lower in the data.
Turning to hours per worker, the CEU is 19% below the US in the data. The model captures
half of this diﬀerence and generates 9.5% lower hours per worker for the CEU. Since we
allow for unemployment and model the diﬀerences in the beneﬁts system, examining the
implications of the model along this dimension is also of interest. Somewhat surprisingly,
the average unemployment rate in the model is quite close to the data both for the US and
the CEU. Again, the UK is an outlier, where the model generates an unemployment rate
of 9.3% compared to only 4.8% in the data. Finally, the model also does well in accounting
for the educational attainment rate26 for the US, but underestimates it for the CEU (21.5%
compared to 27.8% in the data). Of course, in our model, education is currently treated
in a simple manner—as an option for accumulating human capital full time with the same
production function used for on-the-job training—so these comparisons should be taken
with a grain of salt. A more thorough modeling of the diﬀerences in formal education
between the US and Europe is a diﬃcult problem, but also a potentially interesting and
fruitful direction to extend the current model, which we intend to undertake in future work.
6 Inequality Trends over Time: 1980–2003
In the one-factor model studied so far, the price of human capital, PH, is simply a scaling
factor and has no eﬀect on any implications of the model (which is why we normalized it to
26This is deﬁned as the fraction of population aged 24–65 who have completed two or more years of
college education (following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008)).
381 earlier). In other words, the Ben-Porath framework does not have a well-deﬁned notion
of returns to skill. This is an important shortcoming when the goal is to study the changes
in human capital behavior over time in response to skill-biased technical change. Guvenen
and Kuruscu (2009) proposed a tractable way to extend the Ben-Porath model that allows
for a notion of returns to skill and overcomes this diﬃculty. We now describe the necessary
modiﬁcations to the model presented earlier.
6.1 Model 2: An Extended Framework
Suppose that individuals now have two factors of production: they begin life with an endow-
ment of “raw labor” (i.e., strength, health, etc.), and, as before, they are able to accumulate
human capital over the life cycle. Let lj denote the initial raw labor of an individual of
type j.27 Raw labor and human capital command separate prices in the labor market, and
each individual supplies both of these factors of production at competitively determined
wage rates, denoted by PL and PH, respectively. Individuals begin their life with zero hu-










Notice that we now allow both factors of production to aﬀect learning. The motivation
for this speciﬁcation is that an individual’s physical capacity (health, strength, stamina,
etc.) is also likely to aﬀect her productivity in learning, in addition to her ability and
existing human capital stock. Furthermore, Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) show that this
particular speciﬁcation generates plausible implications for the behavior of wages in the
US since the 1970s, which is another reason for adopting this formulation. Finally, both
raw labor and human capital depreciate every period at the same rate . With this new















Skill-Biased Technical Change. The two-factor structure just introduced breaks the
neutrality of the human capital investment with respect to a change in PH. In particular,
27The dependence of raw labor on j makes clear that raw labor can vary across individuals, albeit in a
way that is perfectly correlated with ability. We provide justiﬁcation for this structure later on.
39now a rise in PH increases investment, even when PL is ﬁxed. Before delving into the
quantitative results, it is useful to step back and understand this point more clearly. To
this end, we make several assumptions that yield an analytical expression for the optimality
condition.28 In addition, we also assume PH=PL = H=L, which essentially means that
the relative price of human capital to raw labor is the same as their relative productivity
in the human capital function. Although this assumption is not necessary for quantitative
results, following Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) we make it in the rest of the paper because it
















The key observation is that optimal investment, Qj
s; now depends on the level of H,
unlike in (4) and (6) presented in Section 2.1, where PH did not appear at all. This is
because, in our two-factor model, the marginal cost of investment depends on both H and
L (see equation (18)), whereas the marginal beneﬁt is only proportional to H. As a result,
a higher H (for example, due to SBTC) increases the beneﬁt more than the cost (since
L does not rise), resulting in higher investment. This feature is an important diﬀerence
between this two-factor model and the standard Ben-Porath framework.
6.2 Results: US versus CEU with Fixed Tax Schedules
The extended model has some new parameters that need to be calibrated. Except those
discussed here, all parameter values are kept at the values given in Table 5. An important
point to note is that for the cross-sectional analysis of the previous section, the two-factor
model would have precisely the same implications as the one-factor Ben-Porath model used
earlier. This is because H and L are constant at a point in time and their values can
be normalized to generate exactly the same results as in the previous section. Thus, with
proper choices of H, L, and the distribution of lj, we do not need to recalibrate any other
parameter and can still obtain the same results for year 2003 as before. This is the route
that we follow in this section.29
28We set   1, eliminate the beneﬁts system (
  0 and   0), and set  = 1. For simplicity (although
not necessary), we also set  = 0:
29More speciﬁcally, the two-factor model eliminates initial heterogeneity in human capital but instead
introduces raw labor. We make the same assumptions for lj as we made earlier about h
j
0. That is, we assume
40Table 12: Rise in Wage Inequality: Model versus Data, 1980–2003. The model is
calibrated to match the 23 log points rise in the log 90-10 diﬀerential for the US from 1980 to 2003.
Change in Log Wage Diﬀerentials
Log 90-10 = Log 90-50 + Log 50-10
CEU Data Level 0.070 0.063 0.007
% 91% 9%
Model Level 0.168 0.129 0.039
% 77% 23%
US Data Level 0.230 0.160 0.070
% 70% 30%
Model Level 0.232 0.184 0.048
% 79% 21%
Diﬀerence Data: Level 0.168 0.097 0.063
% 61% 39%
Model Level 0.065 0.056 0.009
% 87% 13%
% Explained 41% 58% 14%
For examining the change in inequality over time, we choose log(H=L) to match the
23 log points increase in the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential in the US from 1980 to 2003. The
required change in log(H=L) is 0.236. With this calibration, wage inequality rises by
0.168 in CEU during the same time, compared to 0.070 rise in the data (fourth column of
Table 12). These results imply that diﬀerences in labor market policies, even when they are
ﬁxed over time, can generate about 41% (= (0:232 0:168)=(0:230 0:070)) of the widening
in the inequality gap between the US and the CEU during this time period.
Another dimension of the rise in wage inequality is seen in Table 2 and replicated in
the last two columns of Table 12. The substantial part of the rise in wage inequality in the
CEU has been at the top: the log 90-50 diﬀerential is responsible for 91% of the total rise
in the 90-10 diﬀerential, whereas only 9% of the rise took place at the lower end. A similar
outcome, somewhat less extreme, is observed in the US where 70% of the rise in the log
90-10 diﬀerential is due to the 90-50 diﬀerential. The model generates a similar picture:
about 77% of the rise in the CEU and 79% in the US is due to the 90-50 diﬀerential. An
alternative way to express these ﬁgures is that the model explains 58% of the increase in
the inequality gap above the median between the US and the CEU but only 14% of the
rising gap below the median. As is clear by now, this is a recurring theme in this paper:
that lj is uniformly distributed and is perfectly correlated with Aj: We also assume that H = L = 1 in
2003, which allows us to use the same mean value and coeﬃcient of variation for lj as for h
j
0 in Table 1.
41Figure 9: Progressivity Wedges at Diﬀerent Income Levels: US vs. Germany, 1983 and
2003














the model explains cross-country inequality facts at the upper tail quite well, but explains
a smaller fraction at the lower tail.
6.3 Results: US versus Germany with Changing Tax Schedules
For the United States and Germany, we were able to construct the eﬀective tax schedules
for 1983, which allows us to conduct a two-country comparison in the presence of both
SBTC and changing tax schedules. The procedure for constructing the 1983 tax schedules
is described in Appendix C.3 and the resulting progressivity wedges are shown in Figure 9.
As seen in the ﬁgure, in 1983 the progressivity of the tax structure in the US and Germany
was similar in both countries up to about twice the average earnings level. And above this
point, the US actually had the more progressive system. Over time, the US has become
much less progressive, whereas the change in Germany has been more gradual, making the
US tax schedules much ﬂatter than that of Germany over time.
Using these schedules, we conduct two experiments.30 First, we consider the case where
there is no SBTC between 1983 and 2003 and the only change has been in the tax schedules
(including the consumption tax rates). No parameter is recalibrated to match any target
30Because of computational burden, these experiments only provide steady state comparisons. Although
solving for the full transition path is beyond the scope of this paper, it could be important for the quanti-
tative results, so future work on this issue is certainly warranted.
42Table 13: US vs Germany: Log 90-10 Diﬀerential with Changing Tax Schedules
Data Model
Baseline Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Taxes Fixed Changing Changing
H (SBTC) Calibrated to US Fixed Calibrated to US
US 0.23 0.232 0.167 0.230
Germany 0.09 0.154 0.010 0.068
% Explained 55% — 116%
in 1983. The results are reported in the fourth column of Table 13 (denoted Experiment
1). In the US, the log 90-10 diﬀerential rises by 16.7 log points compared to 23 log points
in the data. Hence, the ﬂattening of the tax schedule alone explains a signiﬁcant fraction
(about 72%) of the rise in the US wage inequality during this time. To our knowledge, this
result is new to this paper. In contrast to the US, wage inequality barely changes (by +1
log point) in Germany from 1983 to 2003. Thus, the dramatic fall in progressivity in the US
and the small change in Germany alone could explain an important part of the diﬀerence
in the evolutions of inequality between these two countries.
As a second experiment, in addition to changing tax schedules, we now also calibrate
the change in the skill bias of technology such that we exactly match the log 90-10 wage
diﬀerential in the US in 1983. The required change in log(H=L) is 7.5 log points, which
is about a third of the value in the baseline model (23.6 log points). Since the model
is calibrated to exactly match the US wage inequality, we turn to Germany: the log 90-
10 diﬀerential rises by less than 7 log points compared to the 9 log points rise in the
data. Thus, the model easily generates—in fact, it over-explains by 16% (i.e., (0:23  
0:068)=(0:23 0:09) = 1:16)—the growth of the inequality gap between the US and Germany.
For comparison, the baseline model (third column of Table 13) with ﬁxed tax schedules
explained about 55% of the rise in the inequality gap between the US and Germany.
Although these results are certainly encouraging, a caveat must be noted. First, wage
inequality in 1983 depends not only on the tax schedule in 1983 but also on those that
were in place several years prior, since the dispersion in human capital across individuals
results from investments made in previous years. Clearly, the same comment applies to
2003. Although in our exercise we do not account for this fact, it is not clear which way
this biases the results. This is because the US tax system was even more progressive before
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, whereas the progressivity change in the years
43preceding 2003 (say, from 1990 to 2003) was more modest. Therefore, if we were to use
a time average of tax schedules in our exercise (say, 1973 to 1983 and 1993 to 2003), we
conjecture that the reduction in progressivity over time could be larger than we assumed
in the experiment just described (which would attribute an even larger role to taxes).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the eﬀects of progressive labor income taxation on wage
inequality when a major source of wage dispersion is diﬀerential rates of human capital
accumulation. To understand the main mechanisms and their quantitative importance,
we have examined the inequality diﬀerences between the US and the CEU, which diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in their income tax structures as well as in other dimensions of their labor
market institutions. A common theme that permeates all of our ﬁndings is that the model
is signiﬁcantly better at explaining inequality diﬀerences at the upper tail compared to the
lower tail. Institutions, such as unionization, minimum wage laws (as in the case of France,
discussed earlier), and centralized bargaining, are likely to be more important for the lower
tail. However, since changes in the upper tail have been so important during this time (as
we have documented), the mechanisms studied in this paper provide a promising direction
for understanding US-CEU diﬀerences in wage inequality.
We also found that the most important policy diﬀerence for wage inequality is the pro-
gressivity of the income tax system, which is responsible for about two-thirds of the model’s
explanatory power. In addition, endogenous labor supply plays an important ampliﬁcation
role for wage inequality when interacted with progressivity.
There is an active debate in the literature on the appropriate values of the labor supply
elasticity at the macro and micro levels. This paper also has implications for this issue. In
particular, if a micro-econometrician were to use the standard empirical regression of labor
hours on wages to recover the Frisch elasticity (of labor supply) using simulated data from
our model, she would obtain a value of 0.14 in the baseline case when the theoretical value
we set is 0.30 (and 0.26 when the theoretical value is set to 0.50). At the same time, the
labor supply elasticity relevant for human capital accumulation is higher than the theoretical
value because of the ampliﬁcation channel discussed earlier. We have also investigated the
welfare diﬀerences across countries resulting from labor market institutions. The calibrated
model implies that for highest-ability individuals, living in the US yields the highest utility,
44whereas for the lowest-ability individuals, the UK is the best country. For brevity’s sake,
we leave out of the paper a more detailed discussion of these welfare experiments as well as
the micro elasticity regressions (results available upon request).
Finally, we have also investigated if the diﬀerential rise in wage inequality between these
two regions could be explained by the channels explored here. Using ﬁxed tax schedules
over time, the model explains about 40% of the rise in the inequality gap between the US
and the CEU and 60% of the upper tail inequality. In a two-country comparison, we found
that the model explains all of the rise in the inequality gap between the US and Germany,
when the actual changes in the tax schedules were also incorporated.
The model studied in this paper also has implications for how the tax and beneﬁts
systems aﬀect the life cycle proﬁle of wages and it would be illuminating to examine how
these implications compare to the data from the US and the CEU. Such an analysis, however,
requires panel data on wages (to disentangle age eﬀects from time or cohort eﬀects), which
is diﬃcult to obtain on a comparable basis for more than a few countries. One piece of
evidence is available from a Swedish panel dataset, studied by Domeij and Floden (2009).
These authors ﬁnd that the dispersion of wage earnings growth rates over the life cycle
((bj) deﬁned in Section 4.1) is much smaller in Sweden than in the United States. Given
the high progressivity of income taxes in Sweden compared to the US, this outcome is
exactly what is predicted by the present model. An interesting research avenue would be
to conduct a fuller investigation of the life cycle pattern of wages (and also perhaps hours)
in a broader set of countries.
In this paper, we made several assumptions to make the quantitative exercise computa-
tionally feasible.31 As noted earlier, an important direction to extend the current framework
would be by carefully modeling the diﬀerences between the US and the CEU in the ﬁnancing
of their education systems as well as in the kinds of skills taught in schools in both places.
This is a diﬃcult but interesting question that is at the top of our future research agenda.
31The numerical solution of the model requires care because the individuals’ dynamic problem has several
sources of non-convexities. As a result, solving for the equilibrium takes about 14 hours for the US and UK,
and as much as 30 hours for some countries like Denmark. This makes calibration very time consuming,
which prevented us from extending the model in other directions.
45ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
46Table A.1: Correlation between Diﬀerent Labor Market Institutions
Union density Union coverage Centralization & Coordination PW
Union coverage 0.49 1
C&C 0.57 0.75 1
PW 0.88 0.75 0.78 1
PW* 0.81 0.85 0.69 0.93
A Appendix: Progressivity versus Other Labor Market
Institutions
Table A.1 reports the cross-correlations between diﬀerent labor market institutions in a country
and the progressivity of its income tax structure. The progressivity measures we use are PW and
PW* deﬁned in the text. The labor market institutions are union density, union coverage rate,
and C&C (Centralization & Coordination) score. All three deﬁnitions are explained in more detail
later. All three variables are measured in a way that higher numbers indicate more deviation
from a frictionless economy. The main ﬁnding is that both measures of progressivity are strongly
positively correlated with all three labor market institutions. Therefore, countries that have a
more unionized labor force with stronger centralized bargaining are also those that have a more
progressive labor income tax system. To our knowledge, this ﬁnding is new to this paper.
Deﬁnition of Labor Market Institutions.
Union density is commonly measured by the percentage of salaried workers who are union members.
The results of collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers are often extended
(through mandatory and/or voluntary mechanisms) to non-union workers and ﬁrms. The total
fraction of workers covered through such extensions is termed union coverage. Centralization is
a measure that indicates the level at which negotiations take place, such as at ﬁrm or plant level
(i.e., decentralized bargaining), industry level, and countrywide level (centralized bargaining). In
many countries, informal networks and intensive contacts between social partners coordinate the
behavior of trade unions and employers’ associations. Examples are the leading role of a limited
number of key wage settlements in Germany, and the active role of powerful employer networks
in Japan. Therefore, what matters is not only the formal degree of centralization, but also the
degree of informal consensus seeking between bargaining partners. This is generally called the
level of coordination. The C&C score is an index that increases with the level of centralization and
coordination. (Deﬁnitions summarized from Borghijs, Ederveen, and de Mooij (2003).)
B Key Derivations and Deﬁnitions
B.1 Derivation of the Optimal Investment Condition (eq. (19))
Here, we derive the optimal investment condition in the most general framework studied in this
paper (equation (19) in Model 2). The optimality conditions presented earlier in the paper ((3),
(4), and (6)) can all be obtained as special cases of this formulation.
47Under the assumptions stated in Section 6 (i.e., setting   1, eliminating unemployment
beneﬁts and pension payments (
  0 and   0), and setting idiosyncratic shocks to their mean
value), the problem of the agent is given by
V (h;a;s) = max
cs;ns;Qs
u((1 + r)as + ys(1    (ys))   as+1;1   n)
+ V (hs+1;as+1;s + 1)
s.t. ys = (Ll + Hhs)ns   C(Qs):
Note that total tax liability of the agent is given by y (y). The derivative of tax liability with
respect to y gives the marginal tax rate. Thus, (y) =  (y) + y 0(y). Using this expression, we
obtain the following FOCs for this problem
(ns) : (Ll + Hhs)(1   (ys))u1(cs;1   ns) = u2(cs;1   ns)
(as) : u1(cs;1   ns) = V2(hs+1;as+1;s + 1)
(Qs) : C0(QS)(1   (ys))u1(cs;1   ns) = V1(hs+1;as+1;s + 1)
Envelope conditions are:
(as) : V2(hs;as;s) = (1 + r)u1(cs;1   ns)
(hs) : V1(hs;as;s) = ns (1   (ys))u1(cs;1   ns) + ns+1V1(hs+1;as+1;s + 1):
Combining the envelope conditions with the FOCs yields




















ns+1 + 21   (ys+2)
1   (ys)
ns+2 + ::: + S s1   (yS)
1   (ys)
nSg:
B.2 Deﬁnition of y Introduced in Section 3.1
Recall that y was deﬁned in Section 3.1 as “the income an individual would have earned in a
economy identical to the present model, except that unemployment insurance was set to zero.
Mathematically, the deﬁnition is y = h(1   i)n; where n and i are given by the solution to
48the following problem:






(0 j )V (0;a0(0);h0;m + 1;s + 1)
#
s.t. (1 +  c)c +
X
0
q(0 j )a0(0) = (1    n(y))y + a + Tr
y = [h(1   i)]n
h0 = (1   )h + A(hin);
i 2 [0;]:
C Country-Speciﬁc Tax Schedules
C.1 Estimating Country-Speciﬁc Average Tax Schedules
Here we provide more details on the estimation of tax schedules described in Section 2.2. Deﬁne
normalized income as e y  y=AW: For each country, denote the top marginal tax rate with TOP
and the top bracket e yTOP. The values for these variables are taken from the OECD tax database.32
As noted in the text, we already have average tax rates for all income levels below 2 (i.e., two times
AW). For values above this number, we have to consider separately the case where a country’s
top marginal tax rate bracket is lower and higher than 2. In the former case (e yTOP < 2), since we
know the average tax rate at e y = 2, each additional dollar up to 2 is taxed at the rate of TOP.
Therefore, for e y > 2
 (e y) = ( (2)  2 + TOP  (e y   2))=(e y)
If instead e yTOP > 2 (which is only the case for the US and France), we do not know the marginal
tax rate between e y = 2 and e yTOP. Thus, we ﬁrst set (2) = ( (2)  2    (1:75)  1:75)=0:25 and





yTOP 2 (e y   2) if 2 < e y < e yTOP
TOP if e y > e yTOP:
Then the average tax rate function for e y > 2 is
 (e y) =

( (2)  2 + (e y)  (e y   2))=e y if 2 < e y < e yTOP
( (2)  2 +
((2)+TOP)
2 (e yTOP   2) + TOP  (e y   e yTOP))=e y if e y > e yTOP
We use this expression to compute  for e y = 3;4;:::;8 (in addition to the original average tax
rate from OECD website). We then ﬁt the functional form given in equation (8) to these 13 data
points as explained in the text. The resulting coeﬃcients are reported in Table A.2.
32From Table I.7, available for download at www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.
49Table A.2: Tax Function Parameter Estimates
 (y=AW) = a0 + a1(y=AW) + a2(y=AW)
Country: a0 a1 a2  R2
Denmark 1.4647  :01747  1:0107  :15671 0.990
Finland 1.7837  :01199  1:4518  :11063 0.999
France 0.5224 :00339  :24249  :41551 0.993
Germany 1.8018  :01708  1:3486  :11833 0.992
Netherlands 3.1592  :00790  2:8274  :03985 0.984
Sweden 9.1211  :00762  8:7763  :01392 0.985
UK 0.5920  :00390  :32741  :30907 0.989
US 1.2088  :00942  :94261  :10259 0.993
C.2 Deriving Tax Schedules with Diﬀerent Progressivity but Same
Average Tax Rate
To change the average tax rates in Europe without changing progressivity, we apply the following
procedure. Let i(y) be the marginal tax rate in country i for income level y: We would like to
obtain a new tax schedule 
i (y) with the same progressivity but with a diﬀerent level. Thus, we
















Letting this ratio to be equal to a constant k, the new tax schedule  is obtained by the following
expression:
1   
i (y) = k(1   i(y)) for all y: (20)
Let the average tax rate be
 i(y) = a0 + a1y + a2y ) i(y) = a0 + 2a1y + a2( + 1)y:
Plugging this last expression into (20) and solving for (y), we get

i (y) = 1   k + k
h
a0 + 2a1y + a2( + 1)y
i
:
Observing that y i(y) =
R y
0 i(x)dx; we can solve for the average tax rate  
i (y) as
 i
(y) = 1   k + k[a0 + a1y + a2y] = 1   k + k i(y): (21)
The new schedule  
i (y) has the same progressivity as  i(y) but can have any desired average tax
rate. We choose k so that the average labor income tax rate in country i is equal to the average
labor income tax rate in the US.
50C.3 Constructing Tax Schedules for 1983
Here, we describe the formulas we use to calculate the average tax rate at diﬀerent income levels
for Germany and the United States in 1983. This information is obtained from the OECD (1986)
(see pages 104–105 and 244–248 for the US and pages 74–75 and 149–154 for Germany. In all
calculations for Germany, the monetary ﬁgures are in Deutsche Mark (DM). Gross income is
denoted by GM.
C.3.1 Germany
Social Security Contributions. In 1983, the social security system in Germany had two brackets
with their respective tax rates. Speciﬁcally, social security contributions (SSC) were given by:
SSC = 0:1138  (min(GI;64800) + 0:0588(min(GI;48600)):
Allowances. Each worker receives an allowance (tax exemption) of DM 1080 and an allowance
of DM 564 for work-related expenses. The OECD considers other miscellaneous allowances in the
amount of DM 1606. We treat this amount as ﬁxed for all levels of income. Finally, workers are
able to deduct part of their social security contributions determined by this formula:
SSC Allowance = maxf6000   0:18(GI);0g
+min(2340;maxfSSC   maxf6000   0:18(GI);0gg)
+0:5  min(2340;maxfSSC   maxf6000   0:18GI;0g   2340;0g):
Total Tax. Putting together the taxes and allowances just described gives the taxable income
of a worker:
Taxable Income = GI-SSC Allow.-Basic Allow.-Work-related and other Allow.
Now, we can calculate the tax liability to the household. The ﬁrst step is to round the taxable
income.
Rounded Taxable Income (RTI) = round(Taxable Income=54)  54.
We calculate two variables Y and Z that will be used in the calculations that follow. They are
deﬁned as Y = RTI 18000
10000 and Z = RTI 60000
10000 . To obtain the income tax for a worker, we need to
apply Germany’s tax schedule in 1983:
Income Tax=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
zero if RTI  4212
0:22  RTI   926 if 4213 < RTI  18035
(((3:05Y   73:76)Y + 695)Y + 2200)  Y + 3034 if 18036 < RTI  60047
(((0:09Z   5:45)Z + 88:13)Z + 5040)  Z + 20018 if 60048 < RTI  130031)
0:56  RTI   14837 if RTI > 130032
Average Tax Rate =
Income Tax + SSC
Gross Income
:
51C.3.2 The United States
Social Security Contribution. In 1983, the employee social security contribution in the US was
given by
SSC Employee = 0:067  (min(Gross Income;35700))
The employer’s social security contribution matches the employee’s contribution of 6:7% on
earnings up to $35700. Additionally, employers are required to pay an unemployment tax of 6:2%
of earnings up to $7000 and a nationwide average for state-sponsored tax plan of 2:8% of earnings
up to $7624.
SSC Employee = 0:067  (min(GI;35700)) + 0:062  (min(GI;7000)) + 0:028  (min(GI;7624))
Allowances. The total combined allowances and exemptions amount to $2300 per worker.
Taxable Income = Gross Income   Basic Allowance   Tax Bracket Allowance.
Federal Income Tax. Now, we can calculate the tax liability for the household. We need
to apply the US tax schedule in 1983. The ﬁrst $2300 is not taxed, as discussed earlier. The tax
rate is 11% when taxable income is in range (2300;3400); is 13% in range (3400;4400); is 15%
in range (4400,8500); 17% in range (8500;10800); is 19% in range (10800,12900); is 21% in range
(12900;15000); is 24% in range (15000,18200); is 28% in range (18200;23500); is 32% in range
(23500,28800); is 36% in range (28800,34100); is 40% in range (34100,41500); is 45% in range
(41500,55300); and 50% above $55,300.
State and Local Taxes. For the purposes of calculating local and state taxes, the OECD
considers a worker that lives in Detroit, Michigan. Detroit allows an exemption of $600, then a
ﬂat 3% tax is applied. Tax Detroit = 0:03(GI   600). The formula for Michigan’s state income
tax is given by
Tax Michigan = 0:0635(GI   1500)   0:05max(Tax Detroit-200;0) + 27:5
Total Local Tax = Tax Michigan + Tax Detroit
Total Tax. The total tax liability is equal to the income tax plus the social security contribu-
tion and the local tax. Then, we have
Average Tax Rate =
Total Tax Liability
Gross Income
D Pension and Unemployment Beneﬁts Systems
Pension System. The details of the pension beneﬁts system for OECD countries used in
this paper are taken from the OECD publication entitled “Pensions at a Glance: 2007.” The
speciﬁc numbers used in this section are from Table I.2 and the unnumbered table on page 35 of
that document. Further details of these pension systems, including the number of years required to
qualify for full beneﬁts, and so on, are described more fully on pages 26–35 of the same document.
Let yj be the lifetime average of net (after-tax) labor earnings of all individuals with ability level j;
and let y be the same variable averaged across all ability levels. Finally, recall that mR is the total
52Table A.3: Pension System Formulas
a b Ranges Ceiling for Pensionable
Income (as % of AW)
DEN 0.371 0.528 all —
FIN 0.011 0.695 all —
FRA 0.141 0.484 all 300%
GER -0.004 0.621 if yj  1:5 y
0.927 if yj > 1:5 y 150%
NET 0.005 0.928 all —
SWE -0.021 0.735 all 367%
UK 0.257 0.154 if yj   y 115%
0.315 0.096 if  y < yj  1:5 y
0.396 0.042 yj > 1:5 y
US 0.168 0.355 all 290%
number of years a worker has been employed up to the retirement age, and let m be the maximum
number of years of work that an individual can accumulate retirement credits in a given country.










The ﬁrst term approximates the credit accumulation process whereby individuals qualify for full
retirement beneﬁts after working a certain number of years and only qualify for partial pensions if
they retire before that. We set m equal to 40 years for all countries. Diﬀerent countries diﬀer mainly
in the value of the coeﬃcients a and b. Broadly speaking, a determines the “insurance” component
of retirement income, because it is independent of the individual’s own lifetime earnings, whereas
b captures the private returns to one’s own lifetime earnings. In this sense, a retirement system
with a high ratio of a=b provides high insurance but low incentives for high earnings and vice versa
for a low ratio of a=b. Inspecting the coeﬃcients in the table shows that there is a very wide range
of variation across countries. Finally, some countries have a ceiling on pensionable income and
entitlements, which is also reported in Table A.3.
UI System. The OECD provides data on UI beneﬁts that would be paid to a qualifying
person at diﬀerent points during the unemployment spell: (i) in the ﬁrst month after the worker
becomes unemployed, and (ii) after 5 years of long-term unemployment, which we will refer to as
initial UI and ﬁnal UI beneﬁts, respectively. An individual with gross earnings y, who has been









As before, mUI denotes the minimum number of years required to receive full UI beneﬁts, and
partial beneﬁts are received if m < mUI: We set mUI to 20 years for all countries. UI beneﬁts are
assumed to decline (every year) linearly between the rates provided by the OECD for initial and
ﬁnal UI levels. Some countries also have an upper level of unemployment insurance denoted by UI
in Table A.4.
53Table A.4: Unemployment Insurance Formulas
a b UI Ranges of Income
DEN 0.173 0.258 if y  0:75 y
0.367 if y > 0:75 y
FIN 0.285 0.100
FRA 0.010 0.392 2.24
GER 0.091 0.253 0.90
NET 0.205 0.246 if y  1:25 y
0.513 if y > 1:25 y
SWE 0.145 0.375 if y  0:75 y
0.338 0.118 if 0:75 y < y   y
0.456 if y >  y
UK 0.301
US 0.045 0.420 if y   y
0.465 if y >  y
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